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One basic idea of the causal theory of reference is reference grounding. 
The name is introduced ostensively at a formal or informal dubbing. 
The question is: By virtue of what is the grounding term grounded in 
the object qua-horse and not in the other natural kind whose member 
it is? In virtue of what does it refer to all horses and only horses? The 
problem is usually called the qua problem. What the qua problem sug-
gests is that the causal historical theory in the fi nal analysis depends on 
some kind of unexplained intentionality. This is a great problem since 
the whole project is an attempt to explain intentionality naturalistically. 
In this paper, I have two aims: (i) to discuss the most important attempts 
at solving the qua problem; and (ii) to evaluate the solutions. (i) I focus 
on the following attempts for the solution of the qua problem: Sterelny 
(1983), Richard Miller’s (1992), mentioning briefl y more recent attempts 
by Ori Simchen (2012) and Paul Douglas (2018). I also concentrate on 
the attempts in mind and brain sciences as presented by Penelope Mad-
dy (1983) and more recently by Dan Ryder (2004). (ii) In evaluating the 
solutions, I argue that when a metaphysical question “what is to name” 
is replaced/or identifi ed with the question about the mechanism of ref-
erence, namely “in virtues of what does a word attach to a particular 
object”, then the fi nal answer will/should be given by neurosemantics. 
The most promising attempt is Neander’s (2017), based on the teleologi-
cal causal explanation of preconceptual content to which the conceptual 
can be developed, as Devitt and Sterelny suggested in their work (1999). 
Keywords: Qua problem, reference grounding, mechanisms of ref-
erence, intentionality, neuroscience, neurosemantics.
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1. Introduction: the causal theory of reference 
and the qua problem
According to the representatives of the description theory (Frege 1893, 
Russell 1905) reference is determined by a description or descriptions 
that the speaker can give for the person or the thing. According to caus-
al theorists, Keith Donellan (1972), Saul Kripke (1980), Hilary Putnam 
(1975) and further elaborated by Michael Devitt (1981), reference is not 
determined by descriptions but by a causal chain that links the speaker 
to the person or a thing. Here I concentrate on the theory elaborated 
by Devitt and Sterelny (1999). The fi rst attempt was given in Devitt 
(1981).1
One basic idea of the causal theory of reference is reference ground-
ing. The name is introduced ostensively at a formal or informal dub-
bing. The other basic idea of the causal theory is reference borrowing. 
Hearers can gain the ability to use the name in conversation by the fact 
that they are told what the term is by others who have also learned 
about it from somebody else. The chain goes back to the grounder. 
The qua problem is the problem arising in reference grounding. 
The problem is the problem of discovering in virtue of what a term 
is grounded in the cause of a perceptual experience qua-one-kind and 
not qua-another (Devitt and Sterelny 1999: 79–82).
Devitt favorite example is the cat named ‘Nana’. The use of that 
name was grounded in virtue of perceptual contact with that particu-
lar cat. That is, the name refers to that cat in virtue of a grounder/
baptizer having had perceptual contact with her. However, the contact 
is not with that entire particular cat, some contact with Nana could 
be perhaps as she peers around a corner. The question that the qua 
problem poses is why ‘Nana’ refers to the whole individual and not an 
individual time-slice or an undetached part of her. The same problem 
arises in case of a natural kind term such as ‘horse’. The term can be 
gounded in a couple of horses or even one horse, but horses are not only 
horses, they are vertebrates, they are mammals. They are members of 
different/many natural kinds. By virtue of what is the grounding term 
grounded in the object qua-horse and not in the other natural kind 
whose member it is? In virtue of what does it refer to all horses and 
only horses? Why does the term applied in such groundings not project 
to other members or these other natural kinds? The problem is even 
worse. What limits such kinds to only natural kinds? Object of ‘horse’ 
could be grounded as a pet, wooden toy, etc. Why do we not gound them 
as members of such kinds? The term ‘qua problem’ has been coined by 
Kim Sterelny (1983).
1 A short power point presentation of this paper was given at the International 
conference: Devitt’s 80th. Many Faces of Philosophy held in Maribor (May 9–10, 
2018). A much shorter version of this article will appear in Borster and Todorović 
(ed.) forthcoming, celebrating Devitt’s 80th birthday.
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The solution that Devitt and Sterelny (1987/1999) explore is that 
the baptizer/grounder needs to have some idea—some mental con-
tent—about the thing that she/he is naming. For example, you need 
to have an idea that you are naming a whole individual, despite the 
limitations of your causal contact with it. Having such an idea/mental 
content allows the descriptive element to enter the causal chain, so De-
vitt and Sterelny consider compromise with descriptivists to solve the 
qua problem. “It seems that the grounder must, at some level, ‘think 
of’ the cause of his experience under some general categorical term like 
‘animal’ or ‘material object’” (1999: 90–93). The supposition is that the 
individual or kind actually named must be the individual or kind the 
speaker intends to name, so that facts about the speaker’s beliefs and 
concepts enter into the determination of reference. Only indefi nite de-
scriptions are required along with some causal historical contact. What 
the qua problem suggests is that the causal historical theory in the 
fi nal analysis depends on some kind of unexplained intentionality. This 
is a great problem since the whole project is actually an attempt to ex-
plain intentionality naturalisticaly.
Thus Devitt and Sterelny (1999) say they are torn between two 
explanations of reference. The interest in the fi nal explanation takes 
them away from the descriptive theories towards causal theories. But 
the historical-causal theory of reference has a deep problem, the qua 
problem which, as Devitt and Sterelny say, does not seem to have the 
resources to solve. Later in 2002 Devitt says: “I have struggled mightily 
with this problem (1981a: 61–4; Devitt and Sterelny 1999: 79–80), but I 
now wonder whether this was a mistake: perhaps the problem is more 
for psychology than philosophy” (2002: 115, note 15).
The question is then: Can the qua problem be solved and is it a 
philosophical problem?
I proceed as follows: In section 2. I focus on the following attempts 
for the solution of the qua problem: Sterelny (1983); Richard Miller 
(1992); and two recent ones by Simchen (2012) and Douglas (2018). 
In section 3. I concentrate more on the attempts to the solution of the 
qua problem in the sciences, as presented by Penelope Maddy (1983) 
and Dan Ryder (2004). In section 4. I look more closely into Devitt and 
Sterelny (1999) and Karen Neander (2017) proposal and suggestions. 
Section 5. is a refl ection on the mechanisms of reference and section 6. 
is the Conclusion.
2. The qua problem 
and (possible) pure causal solutions 
There has been a number of attempts at solving the qua problem. I will 
look into, to what I consider, the most important ones. And chronologi-
cally I start with Sterelny (1983).
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2.1 Kim Sterelny (1983)
Sterelny’s solution to the qua problem from 1983 adds two additional 
requirements on the grounder. First, the grounding requires not just 
contact with the sample of a general kind but the “assignment of causal 
powers to the kinds” (1983: 116). The grounder must have in mind a 
set of causal powers of the sample, possibly the observable ones. These 
causal powers are grounded in some structure which is common to a 
certain kind (e. g. cathood for cats). So, for example, if the grounder has 
in mind something like ‘mouse catcher’, or ‘coachroach-eater’, she will 
be able to ground the term ‘cat’ in the sample of the kind cat.
The second requirement is the possession or acquisition of recogni-
tional capacities of a general category, i.e., the grounder of the name 
must have acquired a reliable recognitional capacity for the kind re-
ferred to. “One can ground a term on a kind only if one has the abil-
ity to discriminate, reasonably reliably, members of the kind” (1983: 
116). Thus, the speaker will ground the term only if he has in mind the 
causal symptoms of kindhood and if he has the ability to discriminate 
those symptoms. Talking about the recognitional capacities to discrimi-
nate general categories, Sterelny says that they are not psychological 
states individuated internally but that they are constituted by the way 
an individual is embedded in his physical and probably social environ-
ment (1983: 117). The individual simply identifi es. He has a learned 
perceptual capacity similar to an ability to recognize shapes. In that 
sense, it is only knowledge-how.
Miller (1992) who himself tries to offer a better solution to Devitt 
and Sterenly’s solution from 1987 rightly notices that Sterelny’s solu-
tion to the qua problem has the following weak point. What is problem-
atic is the second requirement, i.e., the requirement that the grounder 
has a reliable ability to discriminate members of the kind. Miller says: 
“The reliable ability to discriminate kangaroos will not serve to pick 
out kangaroos qua kangaroos because our hypothetical grounder of the 
term also discriminates speedy herbivores, hopping marsupials, tour-
ist attractions, and food sources. Since the speaker has the ability to 
discriminate all these classes, reference to these classes is not ruled 
out by the restriction as it stands” (1992: 428). Miller does not mention 
the fi rst requirement, ‘the assignment of causal powers to the kinds’, 
i.e., that the grounder must have in mind a set of causal powers of the 
sample. In my view, it is rather mysterious how the grounder has the 
causal powers in mind when the causal powers can be multiple: ‘cat-
hood’, ‘animalhood’. How does the grounder decide? That is the problem 
that qua problem poses, so it cannot be the requirement or the solution 
to the problem.
2.2 Richard Miller (1992) 
Miller offers, what he believes is, a purely causal theory of grounding. 
He argues that Devitt and Sterelny’s (1987) descriptive-causal theory 
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of grounding doesn’t work as a theory of reference, but that a purely 
causal account does. Miller points out that although the problem was 
fi rst recognized more ten years ago2 it remains unsolved and largely ne-
glected. He also stresses that the diffi culty seems crucial also to causal 
theories of perception and mental representation. He focuses on refer-
ence but says that “causal theories of perception and mental represen-
tation unavoidably hover in the background” (1992: 425).3
Miller sets himself a task of showing that although Devitt and 
Sterelny (1987), tentatively explored a compromise with descriptive 
theory in order to solve the qua problem for reference grounding, he 
thinks that compromise is “unwise” because “no hybrid theory can solve 
the qua problem” (1992: 427). Miller’s suggestion rests on Sterelny’s re-
liabilist solution which should be modifi ed to bring out the fact that the 
sample upon which the term is grounded causes the reliable ability to 
discriminate the kind in virtue of its membership in the kind itself. The 
more precise formulation of his solution is the following: The speaker S 
can use his perceptual contact with x to ground ‘N’ on the kind Q if x qua 
Q causes S to acquire a reliable ability to discriminate Qs.
This ‘tightening up’, as Miller puts it, of the causal relation, solves 
the qua problem. Individuals—in Miller’s case individual kangaroos—
have the causal powers that they do in virtue of the classes to which 
they belong. Miller stresses that the ‘x qua Q causes S’ locution needs to 
be explained. The qua problem arises because individuals can correctly 
be said to belong to many classes. His solution depends on the fact that 
individuals have causal powers in virtue of their belonging to certain 
classes. There is no need to look outside the causal powers of things for 
a solution to the qua problem because the qua is built into the causal 
powers themselves (italics mine). The particular stands for whichever 
class shares the causal nature which brought about the acquisition of 
the ability to use the name (1992: 429). In other words, to stress once 
again: The qua is built into the causal powers.
One may surely wonder how is the qua built into the causal pow-
ers themselves? And this is exactly what Miller asks: In virtue of what 
was the grounding in the natural kind to which the individual belongs 
and not in any of the other kinds to which it also belongs? His answer 
is that what the grounder gained was a disposition to think ‘kanga-
roo’ when confronted with kangaroos and not a disposition to think 
‘kangaroo’ when confronted with marsupials, tourist attractions or food 
sources. In virtue of what was the grounding in an individual and not 
its time-slice? What the grounder gained was a disposition to think 
‘George’ when confronted with George and not a disposition to think 
‘George’ when confronted with the time-slice of George. The individual 
2 And now more than a quarter of a century ago.
3 He also points out that: “Philosophers who complain that CTR is too sketchy 
to be worthy of serious consideration ought to examine the detailed and systematic 
development of the theory in Michael Devitt, Designation (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1981: 61–63)” (1992: 425, footnote 2).
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or kind referred to reliably causes the speaker to think ‘N’ (1992: 430). 
However, there is no need for the individual acquiring the name to be 
aware of the properties which caused her to acquire it. In fact, she will 
often not be conscious of them at all. Miller concludes: Even children 
with vocabularies of less than one hundred words do it with ease. It is 
a brute fact that people learn to react one way to ‘dogness’ and another 
way to ‘catness’ without the need for descriptions. The underlying na-
tures of dogs and cats are causes and our ability to use ‘dog’ and ‘cat’ 
are effects. The descriptions we come up with are mere epiphenomena.4
There are a couple of problems with Miller’s pure causal suggestion.
1. “The speaker S can use his perceptual contact with x to ground ‘N’ on 
the kind Q if x qua Q causes S to acquire a reliable ability to discrimi-
nate Qs.” This seems to run immediately into the ignorance and error 
problem, i.e., grounders need not have this ability to discriminate in 
order to refer. The speaker can refer even when ignorant of what the 
person or kind really is.
2. Miller says: “There is no need to look outside the causal powers of 
things for a solution to the qua problem because the qua is built into 
the causal powers themselves” (1992: 429). Apart from this claim about 
something (some stuff?) being built in the causal powers and even if we 
grant that qua is somehow built into the causal powers the grounder 
still has to think about which causal power is in question. Miller says: 
“If this had been a marsupial but had not been a kangaroo, it would 
have caused the speaker to acquire the ability to discriminate marsu-
pials” and “if this had not been a marsupial and had been a kangaroo, 
it would have caused the speaker to acquire the ability to discriminate 
kangaroos” (1992: 429). But the grounder is confronted at the same 
time with marsupial and kangaroo. How is the possible fact that qua is 
built into the causal power going to help the grounder? Causal power 
is built into kangaroos and causal power is built into marsupial. How 
does the grounder know? Obviously, he has to “think” of one or another. 
There does not seem to be a straightforward direct or pure causal link.
3. Miller says: “The truth of these referential hypotheses depends on 
the truth of the counterfactuals: “If this had been a marsupial but had 
not been a kangaroo, it would have caused the speaker to acquire the 
ability to discriminate marsupials” and “if this had not been a mar-
supial and had been a kangaroo, it would have caused the speaker to 
acquire the ability to discriminate kangaroos” (1992: 429). The coun-
terfactual suggestion has the same problem as stated above in 2. The 
grounder, again is confronted with both marsupials and kangaroos and 
the counterfactuals cannot determine which disposition (to think ‘kan-
garoo’ or ‘marsupial’) is going to gain priority in reference fi xing. How 
4 He adds: “This ability to react to underlying natures without knowing what 
they are will probably seem mysterious to descriptivists, but it ought not. Such an 
ability is obviously present in mammals” (1992: 431).
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does the grounder acquires “a recognitional capacity which fi ts George 
like a glove fi ts a hand” (1992: 430–31), is unanswered.
4. Miller mentions the fact that even children with vocabularies of less 
than one hundred words react to underlying properties. He says that 
it is a brute fact that people learn to react one way to ‘dogness’ and an-
other way to ‘catness’ without the need for descriptions. But the innate 
ability to react to underlying properties is not a good argument for the 
qua problem since this problem needs the answer in virtue of what we 
react and not which ability makes us react. In sum, Miller’s solution is 
not the solution to the qua problem seen as a pure causal mechanism.
There are two more recent attempts which try to solve the qua prob-
lem by pure causal mechanism, i.e., avoiding intentional element(s) in 
the grounding and I try to show that they also fail.
2.3 Ori Simchen (2012)
Ori Simchen in his article “Necessity and Reference” (2012) takes up 
a question: Is it possible for a name that in fact names a given indi-
vidual to have named a different individual? Simchen focuses on the 
relation between referring tokens (utterances or inscriptions) of proper 
names and the referents of those tokens. He argues that the relation is 
a necessary one: a referring token could not have failed to refer to the 
thing to which it actually refers. It is plausible that a name refers to 
something only because its referring tokens refer to that thing. Build-
ing on this view, Simchen argues that referential intentions necessar-
ily specify the things they actually do, so no referring token of a proper 
name could have failed to refer to its actual referent. Simchen tries to 
show how this approach solves the qua problem. He says: “We note that 
the present approach contains a ready response to a version of what 
Michael Devitt has termed “the qua problem” as applied to referential 
intentions” (2012: 217–218).
In a rather intricate argument Simchen claims that in employing 
a name referentially, the primary referential intention is a specifi c 
attitude even if it is accompanied by a secondary generic attitude in 
the form of a descriptive intention to refer. There should be difference 
between primary referential (cognitive) attitude and secondary refer-
ential intention and Simchen states that the primary referential inten-
tions are nondescriptive, they are specifi c cognitive attitudes rather 
than generic ones (2012: 220). These cognitive attitudes seem to be a 
matter of necessity. Simchen says: “We conclude that a given token of a 
referring term refers to what it refers to as a matter of necessity” (2012: 
222). On the other hand, referential intentions are different from pri-
mary cognitive attitudes which are supposedly nonintentional although 
it is not clear how. Jessica Pepp in her overview of the collection, when 
presenting Simchen’s article, does not even mention the nonintentional 
cognitive attitudes which seem to be crucial for the solution of the qua 
problem as seen by Simchen. All she says is that “Simchen’s argument 
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for the necessity of the relation between tokens and referents relies on 
the view that speakers refer to things in virtue of their intentions to do 
so” (2012: 18). If the view is that speakers refer to things in virtue of 
their referential intentions, then one cannot see how this could be the 
solution of the qua problem. Furthermore, if referring term is a matter 
of cognitive necessity how does this answer the question that the qua 
problem poses, namely, in virtue of what this cognitive necessity creates 
a particular referential links? It is doubtful that Simchen proposal is 
the solution to the qua problem.5
2.4 Samuel Paul Douglas (2018)
Samuel Paul Douglas in his article The Qua-problem and meaning 
scepticism (2018) offers another solution to the qua problem. The ar-
ticle is not primarily concerned with the qua problem but considers so-
lutions given to meaning scepticism and tries to see why Kripke (1982) 
did not consider a causal-theoretic approach to meaning scepticism. I 
shall mention meaning skepticism problem only in passing, concentrat-
ing on Douglas’s offered solution to the qua problem.
While Kripke (1982) considered a range of solutions to the scepti-
cal paradox, a causal or causal-hybrid type of solution was not among 
them. It has been argued by Kusch (2006) that this is due to the qua 
problem. Kusch argues that the absence of a possible causal solution 
was justifi ed since the attempt of solving the qua problem leaves the 
causal response still open to the sceptical challenge. This is because the 
qua problem includes the requirement that the baptizers have some 
idea of what it is that they are naming and this introduces an inten-
tional element that the sceptic can potentially exploit.
The core question that sceptic asks is the same as the question asked 
for qua problem: What fact makes it the case that a speaker means, or 
refers to, one thing rather than another. As we saw, the solution that 
was proposed to the qua problem by Devitt is to introduce a descriptive 
element into the act of baptizing.6 In other words to repeat, speakers 
would need to have some idea—some mental content—about of what 
kind of thing they are dubbing or baptizing. Before offering his own so-
5 Andrea Sauchelli (2013), in discussing Ami Thomason on existence question 
mentions that Thomason bases her solution on the solution that Devitt and Sterelny 
gave. Thomason’s introduces something that she calls the conditions of applications 
which are supposed to solve the qua problem. Namely, for example, the name 
‘Hokusai’ is grounded and refers successfully because, in the grounding process, the 
agents responsible for the naming of Hokusai implicitly intended to apply the name 
to an entity qua human being. But like in Simchen’s case, Devitt and Sterelny’s 
claim is that, by introducing intentions, the qua problem is created. Namely, exactly 
what is implicitly intended is left unspecifi ed and this underspecifi cation is actually 
the core of the qua problem.
6 Douglas misquotes Devitt and Sterelny (1999) as Devitt (1991) which is actually 
Devitt’s book on Realism and Truth (Oxford: Blackwell) where there is no mention 
of the qua problem.
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lution, Douglas mentions the approaches of Sterelny (1983) and Miller 
(1992). Douglas argues that that the qua problem can be overcome in 
a way that resists sceptical attack by making use of the notion of as-
sertability conditions. His approach requires two key premises. The 
fi rst is that there are conditions under which some assertions made by 
speakers will be accepted by their linguistic peers, or they will be not 
accepted, and that these conditions constrain the behaviour of speakers 
(2018: 75). Let us mention right away that this premise is relevant for 
reference borrowing thus not for reference fi xing and reference borrow-
ing is not a problem in question. The other key premise is that these as-
sertability conditions supervene upon the same causal chain of events 
that ground reference under Devitt and Sterelny’s (1999) account. This 
is the premise that is relevant to reference grounding. In Douglas’s 
words: “The reference of a term supervenes upon the causal chain of 
events that connects our use of that term with its referent (this is the 
point of a causal theory of reference). At any given time, assertability 
conditions must supervene upon that very same causal chain of events” 
(2018: 76). Douglas offers an example: Consider a hypothetical situa-
tion where an individual the linguistic community known as Sam was 
baptized with a different name—Bob—and the causal chain of events 
proceeded from there as previously described. If this were the case, the 
assertability conditions would necessarily be different to those we ex-
perience now. If the chain starts with “Bob,” and no alternative ground-
ing events occur to change which name refers to that individual, then 
the assertability conditions are always going to push speakers towards 
saying “Bob” and not “Sam,” because only Bob features in the causal 
history of that individual in the relevant sense.
First thing to notice is that this example is again more relevant to 
reference borrowing, (what the speakers in the community are going to 
do) rather than reference fi xing. Douglas says: If the chain starts with 
“Bob”. But the relevant question is not if it starts but how it starts, 
how “only Bob features in the causal history of that individual in the 
relevant sense.” As Devitt puts it, to paraphrase, in virtue of what has 
the grounder grounded the term in Bob. In virtue of what the individual 
was named Bob and not Sam? Or in Douglas’s own words: “… speakers 
would need to have some idea—some mental content—about what kind 
of thing they are dubbing or “baptizing.” Douglas’s solution does not 
give an answer to the question that is asked. Further on Douglas says: 
“If the past use of a word has no infl uence on the present use of a word, 
or its infl uence is indeterminate in nature, trying to make sense of lan-
guage becomes fraught with diffi culty” (2018: 76). But past uses are not 
going to give us an answer to the question how the fi rst use of the term 
was determined. If it was determined by what was in the mind of the 
baptizer, then the intentional element that the qua problem points to 
is still a pending danger.
Douglas thinks that he has solved the qua problem and he says: 
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“Finally, this principle (assertability condition) needs to be applied 
to solving the qua-problem. This solution lies in the fact that all the 
words a baptizer might think in the process of baptizing, are themselves 
constrained by their causal history and the resulting conditions under 
which certain meanings of them can be asserted.” (2018: 76, italics 
mine). What is puzzling is the following: How can all the words a bap-
tizer might think in the process of baptizing…be interpreted? Isn’t it the 
case that the qua problem in order to be solved by pure causal links has 
to eliminate the fact that baptizers “think” in the process of baptizing?
3. Qua problem and the brain sciences
The fi rst attempt at solving the qua problem by adverting to the func-
tioning of the brain and giving the neural explanation was made by 
Penelope Maddy (1984) in her article ‘How the Causal Theorist Follows 
a Rule’. She is engaged in considering Wittgenstein’s views on rule fol-
lowing but almost her whole concern is focused on the qua problem. In 
this section I also discuss a more recent relevant attempt by Dan Ryder 
(2004).
3.1 Penelope Maddy (1984)
Maddy says that her goal is “to suggest that the causal theorist has 
the beginning to a reply to Wittgenstein’s sceptical conclusion” (1984: 
464). Maddy is arguing that there is a way to solve sceptical problem 
without appeal to descriptions or intentional states. I present Maddy’s 
arguments and I want to show that Maddy’s suggestion has a lot going 
for it. She mentions the role of reference borrowing and the historical 
chain that goes back to the initial baptizing but she rightly concen-
trates on the moment when the word’s reference is fi xed where inevita-
bly the qua problem looms large. Talking about the natural kind gold 
and the qua problem she points out that “the causal theorist would 
agree that the gesture of pointing is not enough to pick out the metal 
as opposed to its shape or color” (1984: 464). Her answer to the qua 
problem relates straightfowardly to the neurological theory. How does 
the baptizer, for example, perceive and name something as a triangle 
rather than the apexes of the triangle? Here is the quote of the relevant 
suggestion in full:
The evidence suggests that our ability to perceive develops over time by the 
growth of neural structures called ‘cell assemblies.’ Repeated viewing of a 
triangular fi gure fi rst produces an assembly that responds selectively to 
apexes, then assemblies for base angles, and fi nally an integrated assem-
bly that responds to triangles. This large assembly incorporates the others, 
though they can still function independently. Without these assemblies, the 
pattern of stimulation from causal contact with a triangle is a short-lived 
and chaotic buzz; with them, that same pattern of stimulation produces 
a much longer, more organized reverberation. The development of the tri-
angle assembly is what allows us to see the triangle as a unit, as similar to 
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other triangles, to remember it, and so on. In other words, given only the 
original pattern of stimulation from the triangle, we could only be said to 
“see” it in the sense in which one “sees” a hidden fi gure in a complex draw-
ing before one notices it. With the cell assembly, we can be said to perceive 
the triangle as such. (1984: 465)
Maddy discusses a number of objections that someone (including sceptic) 
can raise to her suggestion that the answer to the qua problem lies in 
neurology. I mention the most relevant ones for the present discussion.
1. One demand is that the analysis of psychological notions be concep-
tual and not scientifi c. The argument is the following: “We could have 
the psychological properties we do, that we could perceive and refer, 
with very different bodies, and perhaps even with no bodies at all. If 
so, even if cell assemblies and such do give a causal account of the 
mechanisms by which we actually happen to perceive and refer, this 
sort of account cannot tell us what perceiving and referring actually 
are” (1984: 467). Maddy gives, in my opinion, a very good answer to this 
objection and that is the following: “But if the point at issue is whether 
or not our reference is determinate, all that is needed is an account of 
how this is possible, then there is no reason such an account need be 
conceptual rather than scientifi c” (1984: 468, italics mine).
2. In her answer to the argument that there could be no reference with-
out a community of referrers, she rightly says that this fact does not 
establish stronger conclusion that the practice of this community is the 
mechanism that determines reference (1984: 468). She says: “though 
conceptual analysis may reveal that referring is a practice employed 
by a linguistic community, the referents of particular expressions in 
that community’s language might still depend on mechanisms pecu-
liar to that community and the world it inhabits: no reference without 
community, but community reference determined by community-spe-
cifi c mechanisms and circumstances” (1984: 468). What is important 
to notice here is that Maddy puts great stress on specifi c mechanisms 
by which reference is determined. In her case these are neurological 
mechanisms that with learning experience actually come to be “wired 
in” procedure that the baptizer simply obeys. She argues that refer-
ence is not indeterminate since it is determined by various neural and 
causal facts: “cell assemblies and causal account of the mechanisms.”7 
3. Kusch (2006) criticizes Maddy’s solution. He says that “at fi rst sight 
it seems as if Maddy is able to solve the qua problem in a way that 
avoids descriptions and other intentional items. In her theory, the 
work of fi xing the level and scope at which the baptizing occurs is done 
7 In answering the sceptic (i.e. henchman) she says: “Thus there is a fact of the 
matter about which of us in the object level debate -me or the henchman- is right. I 
may not be able to convince the henchman that I am the one who’s right, I may not 
even be absolutely certain at the meta-level about which of us is right, but there is a 
fact about which one of us is right and one of us is wrong. This is what Wittgenstein 
(i.e. sceptic) denied” (1984: 469, italics mine).
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by non-intentional items such as the stimulation of cell assemblies in 
the brain” (2006: 135). But Kusch thinks that Maddy’s solution fails 
to specify the nature of the relation between brain events and mental 
states. His main criticism is that Maddy does not tell us how these 
brain events relate to mental states. He considers two options that 
Maddy could go and fi nds them both unpalatable. One option is that 
our mental states are reduced to events in the brain. The other is to 
go down the road of eliminativism. Perhaps Maddy would prefer to be 
an eliminativist about intentional states but he fi nds this an extreme 
view. He concludes therefore that Maddy’s proposal for improving the 
causal theory of reference fails and that Kripke (1984) was right not 
to discuss the causal theory of reference since it is unworkable as an 
answer to the sceptical argument.
We cannot go into the discussion of Kusch’s suggestion about reduc-
tionism or eliminativism but Maddy surely does not go for eliminativ-
ism but for reductionism. Maddy does not neglect the question about 
the relation of the physical and psychological and one of her answers to 
possible objections that there are no type-type correlations (or identi-
ties) between psychological and physical states she says: “It isn’t neces-
sary that your cell assembly for triangles be physically similar to mine; 
all that is needed is for the patterns of neural stimulation triangles 
produce in me to belong to a single physical type. This much is assumed 
by the fairly well supported scientifi c theory of cell assemblies” (1984: 
466–467).
In sum, Maddy is combining the causal theory of reference with 
neuroscience. Her goal is to suggest that there is a way of solving the 
qua problem without appeal to descriptions or to the intentional states, 
suggesting that the answer lies in neurology. What the baptizer has 
named will be answered by his brain state, his cell assemblies. Going 
back to our example of naming the cat “Nana” depending on whether 
the baptizer is focusing on the cat, or the color of the cat, or the cat 
as an animal, the brain of the baptizer will be in different states. The 
perception is linked to different cell assemblies in the brain. And thus, 
there will be a fact of the matter as to whether the baptizer “meant” the 
sample for his baptismal act to be the cat, or color or an animal.
3.2 Dan Ryder (2004)
Before going back to more philosophical suggestions for solving the qua 
problem, I want to look into a much more recent attempt similar to 
Maddy’s, i.e., the attempt which relies again on neuroscience and com-
putational theory. Dan Ryder in his 2004 article under the title “SIN-
BAD Neurosemantics: A Theory of Mental Representation” presents an 
account of mental representation based upon the ‘SINBAD’ theory of 
the cerebral cortex. He says: “The ‘neurosemantic’ theory that I present 
is derived from the SINBAD model of the cortex… ‘SINBAD’ stands for 
‘Set of INteracting BAckpropagating Dendrites’; it is a computational 
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theory of cortical plasticity based on functional considerations as well 
as anatomical and physiological evidence. If the theory is correct, net-
works in the cortex have a powerful tendency to structure themselves 
isomorphically with regularities in their environment” (2004: 212). We 
cannot go into details of SINBAD but here is the main outline of the 
idea in Ryder’s own words:
Here then, in brief summary, is how SINBAD networks operate. The mul-
tiple dendrites on a SINBAD cell must fi nd functions of their inputs that 
are correlated. Assuming these correlations are not accidental, the cell will 
tune to their source. In tuning to a source of correlation, a cell will provide 
other cells with a useful input, i.e. an input that helps their dendrites to fi nd 
correlated functions. Thus, these further cells, in turn, tune to sources of 
correlation, and the process repeats. The end result of this complex multiple 
participant balancing act is that a SINBAD network comes to be dynami-
cally isomorphic to the environment from which it receives inputs. (2004: 
222–223)
Ryder concludes that once one understands the underlying SINBAD 
mechanism, it is relatively simple to understand, in basic outline, the 
theory of mental representation that emerges from it. SINBAD cells 
have the purpose, job, or teleofunction of yielding reliable ‘predictions’, 
by participating in internal dynamic structures that are isomorphic to 
the environment. Dan Ryder’s SINBAD theory of content appeals to 
developmental and learning history but focuses primarily on changes 
at the neural level. Each neuron in the brain receives incoming signals 
through branch-like structures called ‘dendrites’. He says: “Since the 
cerebral cortex is the seat of the mind, this gives us some reason to 
believe that SINBAD representation realizes mental representation in 
us, and other creatures with a cerebral cortex” (2004: 232).8
What is important for our discussion is that Ryder claims to show 
how SINBAD neurosemantics can provide accounts of the qua prob-
lem.9 Suppose multiple encounters with horses cause a SINBAD cell to 
acquire matching dendritic functions—is it a horse stand-in or an ani-
mal stand-in? Here is the explanation or solution of the qua problem.
There will normally be a fact of the matter which kind explains how a cell 
has acquired its predictive abilities. The kind horse and the kind animal are 
sources of different sets of multiple correlations that have different underly-
ing (evolutionary) explanations—that is why they are distinct kinds. Horses 
tend to neigh, are usually domesticated, have a particular shape, particu-
lar eating habits, hooves, manes, etc. Animals are characterized by a more 
abstract set of correlated features with a more ancient evolutionary expla-
nation for their coherence: the capacity for spontaneous motion, a range 
of sizes, a disjunction of typical methods of locomotion, a range of typical 
colours, and so on. When a cell’s representational content is determinate, 
its dendritic correlations will be explained by (a part of) one of those sets of 
8 More on Ryder in Rupert (2008). Rupert sees Ryder’s approach as compatible to 
his causal developmental theory.
9 He also has comments related to misrepresentation, equivocal representation, 
twin cases, and Frege cases.
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correlated properties rather than the other. It will either be the properties 
whose correlation typifi es horses, or the properties whose correlation typifi es 
animals that will have historically guided the cell to equilibrium by causing 
synaptic activity. (2014: 233–234, italics mine)
There is a noticed similarity with Maddy’s suggestion in stressing the 
workings of the brain in the attempt to explain the grounding mecha-
nisms. More on this point in the conclusion.
4. Back to the philosophical solutions
4.1 Kim Sterelny (1990)
The unsolved qua problem prompted Sterelny at another attempt (1990: 
124–137). Sterelny suggests that the qua problem might be solved by 
adding the teleological element to the basic descriptive-causal solution 
that Devitt and he proposed in 1987. Sterelny believes that Kripkian 
story may not be right story for primitive content, but rather plays 
a role in the explanations of more cognitively sophisticated structure 
whose content presupposes a conceptual backdrop. The proposal is to 
add teleological elements to the causal story. Sterelny says that “there 
will be an important teleological element in our total theory of mental 
representation, though any attempt to extend the teleological story to 
the human propositional attitude faces the most appalling diffi culties” 
(1990: 138).10 Since his proposal is incorporated in the proposal of De-
vitt and Sterelny (1999) I discuss it in the next section.11 I revert to 
Sterelny (1990) in section 4.3 for more examples.
4.2 Devitt and Sterelny’s (1999) proposal
As we saw, the qua problem does not only concern kinds but the qua 
problem also concerns part-whole ambiguity. What has the grounder 
named: rabbit, parts of rabbits? Or in the vivid example by Sterelny: 
“Why is my concept of Mick Jagger a name for Jagger, rather than Jag-
ger’s voice? Or Jagger’s lips?” (1990: 116). There must be something 
in the mental state of the grounder which determines that the term 
has been grounded via perceptual experience as something as a whole 
object and a member of a particular kind.12 Devitt and Sterelny rightly 
say that it is neither useful nor suffi cient to say that it is the grounder’s 
intentions that makes is so. In virtue of what did the grounder intend 
the whole object? “It seems that the grounder must, at some level, 
‘think of’ the cause of his experience under some general categorial 
item like ‘animal’ or ‘material object’. It is because he does so that the 
10 See also Devitt and Sterelny (1999: 101).
11 For more on Sterelny (1990) see Jutronić (2000).
12 See the most recent exchange on this issue between Reimer and Devitt in 
Bianchi (forthcoming).
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grounding is in Nana ‘the cat’ and not in the temporal and spatial part 
of her” (1987: 65).13 I here review their argumentation.
There will be no grounding if the sample of the perceptual experi-
ence does not correspond to the general categorial term which is used 
in conceptualization.14 Thus concessions must be made. Causal theory 
of reference cannot be ‘pure’ causal. It has to be ‘descriptive-causal’ 
because the term is consciously or unconsciously tied with the descrip-
tion in grounding. Descriptive element has entered the designational 
chain. What is it that determines the nature of the sample? Is it the 
grounder’s mental state? But Devitt and Sterelny admit that it is very 
hard to say what exactly determines this relevant nature.
The further claim is that this modifi cation caused by the qua prob-
lem is only a modifi cation of the causal theory of reference grounding 
while reference borrowing stays unchanged. Borrowers do not have to 
associate the right categorial term. Putnam’s examples with ‘elm’ and 
‘beech’ is harnessed to their support (Putnam 1975: 226–227). The ex-
ample with whales also. What people centrally associated with whales 
was the description ‘fi sh’ and this is incorrect, but people nevertheless 
referred to whales.
Devitt and Sterelny offer what they call a hybrid theory.15 It con-
sists of: 1. Description theory of reference fi xing and 2. Pure causal 
for reference borrowing. The move is from pure causal theory but the 
extent of the move should not be exaggerated because:
a. The associated general categorial term does not identify the object.
b. Modifi cation is only in the grounding theory.
The reference borrowing remains unchanged and pure-causal: borrow-
ers do not have to associate the correct categorial term.16 They bor-
row their reference from others and are unlikely to have true beliefs 
about the underlying nature of the relevant kind but are also unlikely 
to have beliefs suffi cient to identify its members. The causal theory 
lightens the epistemic burden. Thus, the borrower need not have any 
true beliefs, let alone knowledge, about the sense. The sense is largely 
external to the mind and beyond the ken of the ordinary speaker. What 
about other kinds terms? Devitt and Sterelny claim that we cannot bor-
row reference for other kinds terms. For example, for the term ‘pencil’ 
we need the description theory for reference fi xing, the ‘experts’ who fi x 
the reference must associate the appropriate description with the term 
even the rest of us need not. This then can be combined with a causal 
theory of reference borrowing explaining how the rest of us depend on 
13 This is the only quote I use from the fi rst edition of Language and Reality. For 
more on the qua problem in the 2nd edition (1999: 79–81; 90–93; 98–99).
14 See more about this in the discussion between Reimer and Devitt in Bianchi 
(forthcoming).
15 In section 5.3. and 5.5. (pages 96 –101) of their 1999 book.
16 For discussion on reference borrowing between Devitt and Jutronić see: Devitt 
(2006; 2008) and Jutronić (2006; 2008).
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the experts. But the causal theory for borrowers here is supplemented 
with descriptions. A person could not use the term ‘pencil’ to refer to 
pencils if he was completely mistaken about them. Their discussion of 
hybrid theory is quite dense, with very few examples, so here is my at-
tempt at a possible graphic presentation of their view.
PROPER NAMES (Blanka)
   descriptive descriptive-causal causal
grounding    +  (qua-problem)
borrowing      + 
NATURAL KIND TERMS (gold)
  descriptive descriptive-causal causal
grounding    +  (qua-problem)
borrowing      +
OTHER KIND TERMS (pencil)
  descriptive descriptive-causal causal
grounding    +  
borrowing cannot be borrowed without description
What is important for the present discussion is the fact that there is a 
qua problem for proper names and natural kinds terms, arguably not 
for other kind terms. At the end of that section D&S say: “The qua-
problem for our historical-causal theory gives ample motivation for 
us to look elsewhere for an explanation of how reference is ultimately 
fi xed” (1999: 101).
The qua problem is discussed then in greater details in section 7 on 
‘Thought and meaning’. The assumption is that our cognitive capacities 
are closely correlated with our linguistic capacities. More specifi cally, 
the structure of mentalese is closely related to (public) language (1999: 
145). The reference fi xing of a linguistic word depends on the refer-
ence fi xing of the mental word that it expresses, so a theory of the one 
carries over to the other (1999: 156).17 In this section, they look into 
and consider pure-causal proposals of indicator and teleological theo-
ries. These theories have been developed as theories of the relationship 
between thought and the world. Devitt and Sterelny think that these 
theories are best construed as simply theories of ultimate reference 
fi xing to which other theories could be added (1999: 157). They go into 
presenting criticism for the indicator theories (1999: 161) and suggest 
to go totally teleological, explaining representation by biological func-
tion alone since biological function is explained in terms of the history 
17 The same was assumed by Miller when he said: “that causal theories of 
perception and mental representation unavoidably hover in the background” (1992: 
425). In other words, our ability to refer to things in language, and to create words 
that refer to things, depends on the prior ability to think and mentally refer. For this 
reason, discussions of mental reference and reference in language often go hand in 
hand.
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of selection. Their original proposal is the following and I quote it in 
full:
We are attracted by a less ambitious use of teleology to explain meaning. 
Instead of taking about biological functions to determine the contents of 
thought we take them to determine the contents of more or more basic rep-
resentational states, perceptions. Perceiving a rabbit is a matter of being in 
a representational state with biological function of representing a rabbit. 
An interesting thing about this idea is that it does not replace the historical-
causal theory of reference fi xing, it supplements it. That theory…suffered 
from the qua-problem: In virtue of what is a particular grounding of ‘rabbit’ 
a grounding in rabbits rather than mammals, vertebrates or whatever? The 
present idea offers a teleological answer: the grounding is in rabbits because 
it involves a perceptual state that has the function of representing rabbits. 
The teleological theory of perception becomes an essential part of the theory 
of groundings…It incorporates teleology into the historical-causal theory of 
reference fi xing. (1999: 162, italics mine)
This is a very important, promising and fruitful suggestion but since 
there are a very few examples given in their proposal, it is helpful to go 
back to the ideas elaborated a bit more in Sterelny 1990,18 and also to 
see more details about the mechanisms of how this is possibly going to 
work as a solution of the qua problem in Neander (2017).
4.3 Kim Sterelny (1990)
Sterelny stresses that qua problem is the key unsolved problem for 
Kripkian causal theories, and this suggests that Kripkian story, to re-
peat, may not be a right story of primitive content, but rather plays 
a role in the explanations of more cognitively sophisticated structure 
whose content presupposes a conceptual backdrop. If the qua problem 
cannot be solved for non-basic concepts, could it be solved at least for 
the basic concepts?19 Sensory concepts are likely candidates for basic 
concepts but they also pose the qua problem. Does my concept RED 
(when fi rst acquired) name a color or a shade of that color, or even 
an intensity level of light? “Concepts for which the qua problem does 
not arise look decidedly thin on the ground” concludes Sterelny (1990: 
118).20 Nevertheless, it seems very attractive to add teleological ele-
18 Devitt and Sterelny 1999 proposed solution of the qua problem actually relies 
much on Sterelny 1990 which was also presented in Devitt and Sterelny 1987. 
Sterelny’s chapter 6 ‘Explaining Content’ discusses different theories of content, 
concluding with the teleological view of perception (1990: 111–137).
19 Sterelny talks here of concepts while our discussion is about terms. 
Nevertheless, one theory should be good for both. As Sterelny says: “Kripkian causal 
theories were originally developed as a semantic theory of language, but if they work 
at all they should work for the language of thought. The essential idea is that the 
content of a concept is determined by causal links between the individual acquiring 
that concept and its reference” (1990: 114). See also footnote 18.
20 Stanford and Kitcher also express their doubts: “We should at least mention 
Devitt and Sterelny’s interesting suggestion …that there may be primitive terms 
(categorials or simple demonstratives, say) which can be directly grounded in a 
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ments to the causal story since the appeal to the biological function of 
an internal representation is naturalistic, and it gives a more discrimi-
natory machinery.21
In Sterelny’s view from 1990, the semantic base consists of concepts 
that are formed from modular input systems. To go back to the example 
of color. The structure produced is not a shade of color or a particular 
intensity of light, although it is caused by some particular shade or 
some particular intensity. For the biological function of our color vision 
receptors is the representation of a stable and useful fact about our 
environment, namely the color of surfaces. For color vision, like many 
other modular processes, is serviced by constancy mechanisms. Percep-
tual processing works to keep track of invariances in the world, not the 
varying stimulations from it. Teleology then solves the qua problem, 
since the base-concepts are modular concepts. Above the base, the story 
stays much the same, but not quite the same. For example, Sterelny 
says, that Eric has the concept of tigers partly in virtue of his contact 
with tiger specimen and partly in virtue of his descriptive knowledge 
of tigers. Both are required for possession of the concept. Causal con-
tact without any descriptive knowledge is not suffi cient and with the 
descriptive element comes the qua problem. Sterelny thinks that with 
the introduction of the teleological dimension, the descriptive elements 
of ‘tiger’ possession in the modular system are not beliefs or intentional 
states, but the Gestalt of tigers. Unless the modularity hypothesis is 
completely wrong, there will be some course-grained purely perceptual 
representation of tigers. That representation, of course, has nothing 
like enough information in it to select the necessary and suffi cient con-
ditions of being a tiger. Some tigers will not fi t. Something could fi t it 
without being a tiger. The causal link with actual tigers is still neces-
sary for possession of a tiger concept. The teleological dimension added 
then gives enough cognitive background for the rest of the machinery 
Devitt and he posited. Other descriptive-causal concepts, and fully de-
fi ned concepts, can be acquired on these foundations.22
manner that avoids the qua problem. If so, perhaps the descriptions needed for 
reference-grounding will themselves reduce to primitive terms whose reference can 
be grounded without any descriptive component. To our knowledge, however, noone 
has been able to make good on this suggestion, and we shall not pursue it here” (2000: 
127 note 6, italics mine).
21 Sterelny says that “there will be an important teleological element in our total 
theory of mental representation, though any attempt to extend the teleological story 
to the human propositional attitude faces the most appalling diffi culties” (1990: 138; 
see also Devitt and Sterelny 1999: 101).
22 Sterelny states a possible objection to his proposal, i.e., that it has much in 
common with the traditional philosophical program called concept empiricism. The 
program took sensory concepts to be fundamental and given by our innate perceptual 
equipment. He then dissociates his view from concept empiricism: the properties 
modules represent are not sensory properties (our experience of the world) but 
objective features of the world that: a) were biologically important to our ancestors; 
b. are reasonably reliably detectable by an encapsulated special purpose mechanism. 
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Devitt and Sterelny’s (1999) suggestion is, in my opinion, the most 
promising direction for the solution of the qua problem. Teleosemantics 
of perceptual content is where to look for the solution. Teleosemantics 
will yield a perceptual content that can be the basis for explaining in 
virtue of what the grounder had tiger and not mammal, or part of tiger 
in mind when he grounded the term ‘tiger’. Recently their suggestion 
seems even more plausible with the fi ne elaboration of the teleoseman-
tic explanation of the preconceptual/nonconceptual level of sensory per-
ceptual representations found in Neander (2017).
4.4 Karen Neader (2017) 
All I want to do in this section is to state some of the most important 
questions and aims that Neader (2017) makes in her new book A Mark 
of the Mental.23
The main questions are: Do the mental representations with original 
intentionality derive it from nonintentional nature and, if so, how? If in-
tentionality is not a fundamental feature of the universe, what is it more 
fundamentally? What is its ontological grounding? On which noninten-
tional facts and properties of the world does it depend, constitutively? 
(2017: 9). Some of the main aims are: to encourage optimism with regard 
to the naturalization project and also to encourage those who support 
teleosemantics to look into a causal-informational version of it (2017: 3).
Neander defends a theory of mental content that blends elements of 
a teleosemantic approach with elements from a causal theory of refer-
ence and a version of a (similarity-based) state-space semantics (2017: 
22). She has long developed and defended an etiological theory whose 
gist is that the (or a) function of an item (if it has one) is what it was 
selected to do (2017: 39). The only thing that all teleosemantic theories 
have in common is the claim that semantic norms, at their most funda-
mental, supervene somehow on functional norms, among other things.24
The guiding intuition for sensory-perceptual representations is that 
their contents are not what causes them to be produced but what is 
“supposed” to cause them, in the teleonomic sense. Their contents are 
what the systems that produce them have the function to detect by 
producing them. Her argument says that sensory-perceptual represen-
tation refers to what is supposed to cause it. (italics mine)
What concerns us here most is her argumentation for content deter-
mination. A content-determinacy challenge asks of a given representa-
tion to explain why it counts as having the content it has rather than 
some other content (2017: 150). Why does RED have the content there’s 
In short, he thinks that we need conceptual foundationalism without defi nitions in 
which we give a teleological account of the content of base concepts.
23 See her helpful interview on the web, February 15th, 2018.
24 We should, Neander argues, return to something much like Stampe’s (1977) 
starting proposal. His idea was that appealing to functions is a promising way to 
improve a causal theory of reference.
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red (and not, say, there’s color or there’s a fi re truck)? In the parlance of 
qua problem: Why the grounder names the tiger and not the mammal, 
or part of the tiger?
 Neander proposes what she calls Simple starter theory (2017: 149). 
Simple starter theory is based on causal theory (CT) which says: A sen-
sory-perceptual representation, R, which is an (R-type) event in a senso-
ry-perceptual system (S), has the content there’s C if and only if S has the 
function to produce R-type events in response to C-type events (in virtue 
of their C-ness). The simple causal version of teleosemantics entails that, 
for example, the frog’s perceptual representation can have the content 
there’s something small, dark, and moving, and not there’s a fl y or there’s 
frog food. It tries to solve the question of how content is determined.
How does it do it? Here the question of mechanisms come into view. 
A sensory-perceptual system has sensory receptors, which are cells or 
other units adapted for transducing energy from the environment into a 
medium that a cognitive system uses for information processing. Thus, 
importantly, if there are two dispositions they call for two different 
mechanisms (2017: 169, italics mine).25
Neander mentions Sterelny (1990) and his question: Why does a 
sensory-perceptual representation (R) refer to C and not to Q when Q 
is a proximal (intermediate) link in a C-to-R causal chain? (2017: 222). 
And her answer is that, R refers to C rather than the more proximal 
Q if the system responsible for producing Rs was adapted for respond-
ing to Qs (qua Qs) by producing Rs as a means of responding to Cs 
(qua Cs) by producing Rs, but it was not adapted for responding to Cs 
as a means to responding to Qs. (so it is not the shade of color red but 
color red in the example given by Sterelny 1990). In sum, the simple 
causal-informational version of teleosemantics, CT, says that a senso-
ry-perceptual representation refers to the environmental feature it is 
the function of the system to detect by producing the representation. 
But Neander warns us, its scope is restricted to nonconceptual sensory-
perceptual representations.
If the causal-informational version of teleosemantics offered by 
Neader delivers suffi ciently determinate contents for nonconceptual 
sensory-perceptual representations, then Devitt and Sterelny’s sug-
gestion to look for the answer of the qua problem in this direction is 
a promising line that might lead us from preconceptual to conceptual. 
Rather than introducing a descriptive element into that content there 
is hope (and now more than hope) that teleosemantics will yield a per-
ceptual content that can be the basis for explaining in virtue of what 
the grounder had, for example, Mick Jagger and not his lips, in mind 
when he grounded ‘Jagger’.
How we can get from nonconceptual to conceptual content? Neander 
says: “What is left is the ramping-up problem, which is the problem of 
understanding how to get from a theory of content for nonconceptual 
25 Note the similarity with Maddy and Ryder.
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representations to a theory of the referential power of sophisticated 
human thought” (2017: 26). Neander gives us hints since she (I think 
rightly) believes that the distinction between conceptual and noncon-
ceptual representations is not that sharp. One of the suggestions is that 
the mind, for example, abstracts or subtracts from the specifi c features 
of specifi c triangles to form an abstract idea of triangularity (2017: 
206).26 Or by averaging the shapes of category members. “We could like-
ly produce recognizable results by averaging the shapes of diverse cows, 
diverse cats, diverse carrots, diverse cars, and so on. These categories 
are counted as ‘basic’ categories in part for this reason, and they are ap-
parently learned more easily than other categories” (2017: 210).
5. What are the mechanisms of reference?
How much should a philosopher worry about mechanisms, in this par-
ticular case, mechanism(s) of reference? Where shall we look for an 
answer. Turning to the mechanism we are admitting, in Devitt’s words, 
that we cannot fi nd the answer within philosophy but the answer might 
be given by psychology or psycholinguistics? Looking into mechanism of 
reference we seem to be leaving the philosophical ground. However, if 
the psychological mechanisms point to the solution of the qua problem 
can we say that we have the solution which is in a way indirectly solu-
tion to the metaphysical, i.e., philosophical question. If a philosopher 
who is a naturalist closely relates his answers to science, then scientifi c 
answers are very relevant to his philosophical questions and solutions. 
It is worth looking at bit more into the relation between metaphysi-
cal (philosophical) questions, semantic dispositions and mechanisms 
behind them. At which point can we say that the qua problem stops be-
ing a philosophical problem? One thing to notice is that when you look 
up the entry on reference in Stanford Encyclopedia online, all the talk 
is about mechanisms. Here are just a few passages (italics are mine): 
The central issues, the central questions, concerning reference are four: (i) 
What is the mechanism of reference? In other words, in virtue of what does 
a word (of the referring sort) attach to a particular object/individual?
Assuming that at least certain sorts of terms do in fact refer, the central 
question regarding linguistic reference becomes: how do such terms refer? 
What, in other words, is the ‘mechanism’ of reference?
This suggests that names are semantically different from descriptions, 
which in turn suggests that the mechanism by which a name refers cannot 
be identifi ed with some defi nite description. (Michaelson and Reimer 2019)
Wettstein (2004) says that the phrase ‘the mechanism of reference’ 
originates with McGinn (1981). McGinn says: “Reference is what re-
lates words to the world of objects on whose condition the truth of sen-
tences hinges. It is natural to wonder what sorts of relations underlie 
the reference relation, to wonder, that is, what constitutes the mecha-
nism of reference” (1981: 157, italics mine). McGinn seems to closely 
26 Maddy’s idea about triangles quoted in section 3a is a similar idea.
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relate answering the question about the mechanism of reference to an-
swering one of the foundational philosophical question.
In the book Reference and referring Pepp stresses: “…reference is of-
ten thought of as the bond between language and the world, or between 
language and the aspects of the world that language is used to talk 
about. Referring is often thought of as the activity in virtue of which 
that bond holds. A distinctive question about reference and referring 
concerns what makes this bond hold, or what the nature of this activity 
is: what is the mechanism by which language is tied to the particular 
things that are its subjects? I will call this the ‘mechanism question’ 
about reference” (2006: 1, italics mine). Here again, let us notice, the 
question: what is the nature of referential relation (bond) is identifi ed 
with the question what the mechanism of this bond is?
How is metaphysical question what is to name related in virtue of 
what question? Descriptive theories of reference, to my knowledge, have 
not been referred to as mechanism of reference. They were replaced by 
the causal historical theory of reference. The relation between name 
and referent was reduced to a causal chain. Kripke called it a “better 
picture” but we can see this label as a metaphorical expression for a 
new kind of mechanism of reference. Devitt would surely agree that 
Kripke was giving an important and crucial philosophical contribution 
to the theory of reference but can still insist/claim that the explana-
tion of the mechanism of reference cannot be given by philosophers. 
Miller in his article trying to support the pure causal theory of refer-
ence grounding says: “… I also trust it will not seem like handwaving 
for the philosopher to say that a detailed account of the actual causal 
mechanism of perceptual constancy is a job for the experimental psy-
chologist” (1992: 431). Miller, like Devitt, is actually saying it is not 
the philosopher’s task to give an account of the mechanisms. Or is it 
an even stronger claim that philosopher is in no position to give such 
an account?
More generally, beyond the qua problem and its solution, one can 
ask where does a philosophical question stop being philosophical? Ne-
ander (2017) distinguishes why questions and how questions and says 
that why questions ask about the origin, presence and persistance of 
something while how questions ask about how systems operate. She 
fi nds this distinction in Mayr (1961: 1502) who drew a distinction be-
tween two main branches of biology that he called ‘evolutionary’ and 
‘functional.’ The evolutionary biologist is concerned with why-ques-
tions, whereas the functional biologist “is vitally concerned with the 
operation and interaction of structural elements, from molecules up 
to organs and whole individuals.” (2017: 48). Now Neander says that 
those whom Mayr calls ‘functional biologists’ are those whom she here 
calls ‘physiologists and neurophysiologists.’ She does not say where her 
own teleosemantic theory, or teleosemantic theories in general, belong. 
Do they answer why questions or how questions? Where does Neander 
see herself, as a philosopher or a scientist or something in between? 
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Obviously as a philosopher but a great deal of her discussion is the 
discussion of how questions since one of her main goals is to solve the 
mechanisms of nonceptual/preconceptual content.
As we saw Maddy (1984) is giving the answers to the qua problem 
in neurological terminology. “Neural connections between perceptual 
assemblies for samples and perceptual assemblies for word types are 
“wired in” (Maddy 1984: 474) and she points out: “But if the point at 
issue is whether or not our reference is determinate, all that is needed 
is an account of how this is possible, and there is no reason such an ac-
count need be conceptual rather than scientifi c (1984: 468).
More recently Ryder (2004) is talking about learning mechanism 
as brain mechanism in which each dendrite is adjusting so as to bring 
that dendrite’s contribution closer to that of each of the other dendrites 
that contribute to the fi ring of the cell in question in order to yield 
reliable ‘predictions’. The answer is given by science. It is a core as-
sumption in cognitive science that cognitive processes involve formal 
operations on structured representations. That is to say that these op-
erations are conceived as causally sensitive to the physical, chemical, 
or neurophysiological properties of the representational vehicles rather 
than their semantic properties.
Going back to Neander, she says that her book is ‘ambitious’ be-
cause it tries to make genuine progress in relation to one of the most 
diffi cult problems in philosophy of mind—that of understanding the 
fundamental nature of intentionality (2017: 243). As was pointed out, 
her argument relies on claims concerning explanatory concepts and 
practices in the mind and brain sciences.27 She says: “Informational 
teleosemantics is supported by the explanations of cognition that the 
mind and brain sciences currently provide” (2017: 74). Teleosemantics 
is based on what “the mainstream branches of the sciences devoted 
to explaining cognitive capacities ascribe normal-proper functions to 
cognitive mechanisms and assume that these include functions to pro-
cess information. It makes excellent sense to try to understand how far 
these information-processing functions can take us in understanding 
the nature of mental content” (2017: 96). Her philosophical argumen-
tation is based on scientifi c theories and she believes the two cannot/
should not fall apart. “Whichever approach is adopted, the science and 
the philosophy cannot be divorced if the content ascriptions a philo-
sophical theory of content generates are to be relevant to explaining 
cognition” (2017: 96).
A naturalistic theory of intentionality is one that explains intention-
ality using the resources available from the natural sciences. From the 
standpoint of philosophers that are naturalists, semantic naturalism is 
committed to the idea that the relevant kind of theory of intentionality 
ought to be reductive and construed in terms of some natural science. 
27 See specially section (4) on the Methodological Argument for Informational 
Teleosemantics.
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The vocabulary is that of the natural sciences, and in biosemantics this 
means that it is the vocabulary of biology. Given that functionalism is 
commonly based on a physicalistic ontology, the mental states that are 
supposed to be a part of “causal pushes and pulls inside the head” are 
proclaimed to be physical states, more specifi cally, neural states. Thus, 
mental concepts apply to neural states of the brain.
If we accept the above, then it is plausible to talk about levels of 
explanations of particular referential bonds, starting maybe from 
common sense, through different kinds of philosophical causal theo-
ries on one hand, and neurological “hard-science” explanation on the 
other. Where philosophy stops and science begins is not easy to say. 
They are, from naturalistic point of view, continuous. Different phi-
losophers draw different lines between the two. For example, Lycan 
says: “Remember also that the principles of psychosemantics itself are 
philosophy, not science. And they remain unsettled to say the least” (in 
his 2006 talk). He would probably not agree with Devitt when he says 
“these (referential) mechanism seem to me to be psychological matters, 
not philosophical ones”. On the other hand, if the ultimate answers are 
expected to be given by science, in this case brain sciences, and this is 
probably what Devitt had in mind when he decided to stop worrying 
about in virtue of what question.
6. Conclusion
1. There is no pure causal theory of grounding, in spite of the discussed 
attempts to show that reference grounding is a causal process. It is 
clear that descriptions play a role in fi xing or grounding the reference. 
And the given attempts to solve the qua problem in purely causal term 
fail. Stanford and Kitcher in examing what they call “Simple Real Es-
sence Theory” (SRT) say: “As Michael Devitt and Kim Sterelny point 
out, a theory like SRT is too simple…because it is utterly mysterious, 
how without something more than our causal relation to the sample, we 
can pick out one, rather than another, of the many kinds the sample 
instantiate” (2000: 100–1, italics mine).
2. As far back as in 1981 Devitt argued that a causal-historical theory 
can be naturalized if it is articulated in terms of causal relations of the 
right kind, although it will then still be incomplete. In other words, it 
will lack a solution to the qua problem. I found Devitt and Sterelny’s 
suggestion to incorporate teleology into the historical-causal theory of 
reference fi xing (1999: 162) a very promising idea. The idea is straight-
forward: If mental states or semantic properties as not fundamental, 
any appeal to them in an analysis of the reference relation must even-
tually be accounted for in other terms and teleosemantics seems to 
ground them.
3. If naturalism is an approach to philosophy that involves using sci-
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ence, ultimately physics, as our guide to the fundamental ontology of 
the universe the solution the qua problem is found by those who do 
neuroscience and brain neurology. We saw an earlier attempt by Mad-
dy (1983) and more recent one by Ryder (2004) who also looks for an an-
swer in brain sciences. Since the cerebral cortex is the seat of the mind, 
Ryder argues that SINBAD representation realizes mental representa-
tion with a cerebral cortex. Usher (2004) states that the merit of the 
SINBAD model is to provide an explicit mechanism showing how the 
cortex may come to develop detectors responding to correlated proper-
ties and therefore corresponding to the sources of these correlations. 
Such and similar attempts offer hope of naturalistic explanation of ref-
erence, i.e., in bringing semantic relations within the scope of physical-
ist view of the world. The real explanatory work is done by science but 
the work is far from been done as Stanford and Kitcher, discussing the 
natural kind terms, point out and say: “sadly, the course of reference 
fi xing in actual scientifi c cases is even more complex than (our) analy-
sis shows” (2000: 114, italics mine).
4. Neander argues that the naturalistic theories on which most work 
has been done of late are the teleosemantic theories. According to such 
an analysis (Neander 1991) items of a type have the function of doing 
what that type of item was selected for doing. Teleosemantics will yield 
a perceptual content that can be the basis for explaining in virtue of 
what the grounder had Mick not his lips in mind when he grounded 
‘Jagger’. Neander’s detailed analysis of preconceptual content gives 
great hope that conceptual can be developed from this more basic con-
tent and gives us explanation how the qua problem can be solved. But 
as Neander reminds us “we should also keep in mind that serious work 
on naturalistic theories of content has only been going on for decades 
rather than centuries and that, on a philosophical timescale, that is 
quite a short time (in Stanford Encyclopedia)”. Or as Devitt said in 
Maribor: “Rome was not built in a day.”
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